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STATEMENT OP ISSUES 
This Reply Brief on behalf of James V. Eidson and 
Kathryn Eidson, his wife, Defendants and Appellants in this 
matter, hereinafter usually referred to by their surname, is 
written to address new matters raised in the Brief of Respondent• 
Upon learning of the new matter, especially concerning some very 
basic information of which Eidson had never been informed, legal 
counsel was retained to address the Court in regard to these 
issues. 
The Court below granted Summary Judgment on or about 
July 27, 1987, based upon the record before it. On August 10, 
1987, in a Motion in which Mr. Eidson expressed "bafflement", 
Eidsons indicated their lack of an understanding as to how it was 
that the Judgment was granted against them and their desire to 
appeal. The appeal process was begun, formally, apparently 
without further inquiry by the Court or counsel for the 
Plaintiff. 
The Eidsons filed an "Appellants' Brief". Plaintiff 
responded. Pursuant to that response, Eidsons learned that it 
was not an oral motion which led to the Summary Judgment, but 
that a Motion with Supporting Affidavits had been filed with the 
Court. These Affidavits, and, therefore, their content, were 
unknown to Eidson, and, therefore not dealt with in the 
Appellants7 Brief. As a result, the Affidavits which were before 
the Court provide Eidsons with new matters to be dealt with in 
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this Reply Brief, as does the issue in regard to their failure to 
respond. Those new matters, and issues arising therefrom shall 
be dealt with in this Reply Brief. 
The key issue before the Court remains: Is there any 
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, and, 
therefore, a genuine issue of material fact in the Plaintiff's 
action? If so, the Court below erred in granting the Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Eidsons. Sub-issues for consideration 
are: 
A. Was the Affidavit of Chris Evans, on behalf 
of Plaintiff Garfield Credit Union, sufficient under Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to establish evidence 
upon which Summary Judgment may be granted? 
B. Should the Court have given consideration to 
the pro se answer filed by Mr. Eidson at the time it 
considered the Motion for Summary Judgment? Does Eidsons' 
"Failure to Respond" to the Motion with Supporting 
Affidavits for Summary Judgment require the Court below to 
grant Summary Judgment? 
C. Is there any evidence of jurisdiction over 
Mrs. Eidson? 
The new information gained in and as a result of the 
Respondent's Brief requires a review of it, and its impact upon 
the arguments previously made, pro se, by Appellant Eidson. The 
indulgence of the Court in the interest of substantial justice is 
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respectfully requested. Through this Reply Brief, the legal 
issues should be adequately addressed, to enable the Court of 
Appeals to rule. 
RULE 56, UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover 
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration 
of 2 0 days from the commencement of the action or after 
service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse 
party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a 
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion 
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for 
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; 
defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of 
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavit. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, 
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, is appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
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STATEMENT OP CASE 
It is unnecessary to restate the description of the 
case. Appellants7 Brief, filed pro se, essentially reviewed the 
pleadings of which Eidsons were aware at the time that the Brief 
was filed. Respondent's Brief generally described that which has 
taken place, procedurally. However, certain information was 
misstated or not stated at all in the Respondent's Brief. The 
Eidsons object; and accordingly offer the following corrections 
for consideration by this Court, as a necessary part of its 
understanding of the case as it relates to the issues before this 
Court: 
1. Mr. Eidson signed and timely filed pro se an 
answer, to the Complaint of the Credit Union. 
2. In that Answer, Eidsons raised defenses with 
detailed testimonial pleading in regard to the facts known to Mr. 
Eidson. The affirmative statements clearly raised factual issues 
in regard to the Complaint of the Credit Union. Key among them 
were issues in regard to the repossession of an automobile, with 
his cooperation, by the Credit Union, and questions in regard to 
the amount remaining due, based upon his belief that he had made 
payment in full of the smaller Promissory Note complained of. He 
also noted that the allegations were technically incorrect in 
regard to the Promissory Notes. 
3. Plaintiff's Complaint incorrectly stated the 
interest rates which applied to the Promissory Notes as they had 
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originally been signed. The allegations of the Complaint were 
inconsistent with the exhibits, on their faces. (See Complaint, 
p.2, and exhibits) The effect was that eighteen (18%) percent 
interest was applied to the larger note with the face amount of 
Eight Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two ($8,542.00) Dollars, 
despite the fact that the Note attached to the Complaint clearly 
called for fourteen (14%) percent interest. Judgment was also 
granted on this basis. (See Point 5, below, also.) 
4. As noted by Respondent, an Affidavit of a Chris 
Evans was filed in connection with the Motion for Summary 
Judgment by the Plaintiff Credit Union. Because of its 
importance, a copy of the Affidavit is attached to this Brief. 
Eidsons did not receive the Affidavit of Chris Evans, or the 
other pleadings concerning the motion. (See Eidsons7 August 10, 
1987, Motion for Appeal and Docketing Statement dated September 
25, 1987, paragraph 4.) 
[Plaintiff, in its Respondent's Brief, submits to the 
Court that these pleadings were sent to Eidsons " * * * at the 
same address which is still listed in all Appellant's pleadings." 
(page 3) However, this is clearly not the case. Appellants' 
Brief, for example, spells "Bellerive" differently, and also 
indicates Normandy as the city, rather than St. Louis, and sets 
forth a zip code. There has been no opportunity to present 
evidence in regard to the potential impact of such differences. 
There is also no sworn evidence before the Court that the 
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pleadings in question were actually mailed. There is a signed 
Mailing Certificate in the file indicating that it was sent, and 
signed Motion and Docketing Statements indicating that it was not 
received.] 
5. Contrary to the implication made in the 
Respondent's Brief (page 3), there was no evidence before the 
Court in regard to which interest rate was applied to which 
Promissory Note indebtedness, despite the fact that it is clearly 
indicated that two separate Notes had been signed and that two 
separate interest rates had been applied. See the Affidavit of 
Chris Evans, wherein such evidence should be, but is not, found. 
The Judgment incorrectly indicates that eighteen (18%) percent 
interest is and be applied to the larger Note, as indicated 
above. 
6, The Plaintiff Credit Union, in Respondent's Brief, 
(page 2) asserts that payments by Eidson "were not timely made" 
and that, therefore "they were applied mostly to accrued interest 
* * * ". There is no evidence in regard to this statement in the 
record before the Court. Rather, and to the contrary, the 
statement of Chris Evans in paragraph number 11 of her Affidavit 
(page 4 thereof) , and the statements of Eidson in his pleadings 
(Answer, page 2, paragraph 6) indicate only that payments were 
made by payroll deduction until the employment of Mr. Eidson at 
Kennecott was terminated by reduction in force. 
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It is the position of Eidsons that the relevant 
evidentiary facts, upon which the determination of the Court 
below should have been made, are set forth in both the pro se 
answer signed and filed by Eidson and the Affidavit of Chris 
Evans on behalf of Plaintiff Credit Union, filed in connection 
with the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Motion for Appeal, 
filed on August 10, 1987, by Mr. Eidson should also be taken into 
consideration in connection with its statement in regard to what 
had been received. 
No Statement of Facts will be made in this Brief. To 
do so would be repetitious of the issues raised in argument, 
below. The Justices of the Court are respectfully encouraged to 
thoughtfully review that which was before the Court below at the 
time that the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, especially 
those portions referred to below. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 56 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, was not 
entitled to Summary Judgment upon the motion made and pleadings, 
together with Affidavits, in the file. There are genuine issues 
as to material fact. At the least, issues remain which are 
unresolved by the evidence which was before the Court, in regard 
to the question as to whether or not the collateral vehicle of 
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Eidson had been repossessed, and also in regard to the accounting 
for payments made by or on behalf of Eidson. 
The Affidavit of Chris Evans, as it applies to the 
repossession issue, does not meet the standard set forth in Rule 
56(e). The statements made in regard thereto (paragraph 10, on 
page 4) are made without personal knowledge. It does not set 
forth facts which would be admissible in evidence, but rather 
refers to hearsay. Further, no affirmative showing was made to 
indicate that the witness was competent to testify as to the 
matters stated in regard to the repossession. Accordingly, the 
Affidavit raised genuine issues of fact appropriate for trial. 
The standard in regard to evidence was not met in 
relation to the statements concerning accounting of payments. 
Again, there was no affirmative showing that the witness was 
competent to render an opinion in regard to the accounting. 
Further, the best evidence of the record of payments would be 
copies of the entries for the account of Mr. Eidson at the 
Plaintiff Credit Union. Again, by raising the issues, questions 
of fact and ambiguities were drawn before the Court. 
The pro se answer signed by Mr. Eidson, and filed by 
him with the Court, raised issues of fact which were not 
controverted by competent admissible evidence. It is submitted 
that, the said pro se answer, in its content, was tantamount to 
an Affidavit, in that it contained factual information over the 
signature of Mr. Eidson. Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure, that pro se answer should have been given 
consideration by the Court in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Eidson. 
Despite the failure of the Eidsons to respond to the 
Affidavit and Motion, the Court had a duty to inquire fully into 
the record to determine whether any genuine issue as to material 
fact existed. Further, the failure of the Eidsons to respond to 
the Motion should be excused. They did not believe that there 
was any evidence before the Court to which they should respond. 
The Court below had no evidence before it upon which it 
could determine that jurisdiction existed against Mrs. Eidson. 
No statements in the Affidavit were made in this regard. 
Further, the response, filed pro se, by Mr. Eidson, clearly 
indicated that that jurisdiction was disputed. In addition, 
genuine questions of fact exist for determination by the Court. 
Accordingly, the Judgment of the Court below granting 
Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff failed to establish that no genuine issue of 
fact exists, and, therefore, facts remain in dispute in the 
matter before the Court. The Court below erred in granting 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
It is well established in Utah that: 
Summary Judgment is proper only if the 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions 
show that there is no genuine issue of material 
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fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. If there is any doubt 
or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing 
party. Thus, the Court must evaluate all the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing Summary Judgment. 
Bowen vs. Riverton City, Utah, 656 p.2d 434, 436 (1982), as 
quoted in Frisbee vs. K & K Construction Company, Utah, 676 P.2d 
387 (1984). See also Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the matter at hand, the Court below had before it a 
Complaint; a pro se Answer on behalf of Defendants, signed by 
Defendant James Eidson, setting forth affirmatively, in a 
testimonial form, factual information; and a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, with Supporting Affidavits from Chris Evans and counsel 
for the Plaintiff. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is that 
under which a Motion for Summary Judgment may be made. At Rule 
56(e), the standard for the evidence to be considered by the 
Court, in an affidavit, is set forth. It is stated: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. * * * When a 
Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this Rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. * * * (Emphasis applied) 
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A Plaintiff Credit Union, in this matter, failed to 
establish, hy compet.enL , adrni asible ev i dence , that no genuine 
issue of fact existed. 
The Plaintiff relied upon the Affidavit of Chris Evans, 
a Collections Assistant Manager, to establish its case. The 
Affidavit indicated that Ms. Evans was personally familiar with 
the account, in her capacity in the collections department. It 
laid no other foundation for the statements made. Yet, the 
Affidavit recited information in regard to an accounting by 
application of variables such as interest rate, time, and receipt 
of numerous payments, Ms. Evans also responded to the Answer 
filed by the Defendants, the Eidsons. (Paragraphs 7 through 13, 
Affidavit of Chri s Evans ) 
Ms. Evans did not establish, affirmatively, as required 
by Rule 56(e), that she is competent to testify i:: regard to the 
subject matter. FOJ example, she stated that the collateral 
automobile had not been repossessed by the Plaintiff to the best 
of her knowledge. (Paragraph 10, page 4, Affidavit of Chris 
Evans.) However, she did not indicate the period of time during 
which she had been employed by the Plaintiff Credit Union. The 
Affidavit was signed on June 4, 1987. The repossession of the 
automobile is alleged in the Eidson's Answer ("to which she refers 
in her Affidavit) to have taken place on approximately October 
16, 1982 There is no indication that she was employed by the 
company at that time, or had personal knowledge in regard to the 
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facts surrounding the alleged repossession of the automobile. 
(She refers to knowledge about an investigation to located the 
collateral. However, it is clear from a reading of paragraphs 10 
and 12 of that Affidavit that the investigation took place in 
1986 or 1987, long after the alleged repossession. It is, 
therefore, indeterminative.) There is no indication as to the 
degree to which the repossession question was investigated by the 
Affiant. 
Ms. Evans' competence was not established in regard to 
the accounting, either. Although she indicated that she was 
familiar with the loan account, she provided no evidence which 
would indicate that she is competent to provide an accounting. 
Serious questions are raised in regard to the amount of interest 
which would appropriately accrue against the debts. The 
Complaint and the Affidavit of Chris Evans each indicate that 
eighteen (18%) percent interest would accrue against the 
principal balance remaining due on the Eight Thousand Five 
Hundred Forty-Two ($8,542.00) Dollar Promissory Note dated March 
17, 1981. Eidsons' Answer denies the allegation, and points out 
the apparent mistake. A review of the record clearly indicates, 
by reference to the copy of the Note, itself, that fourteen (14%) 
percent interest should have accrued against that amount. No 
foundation is set forth in the Affidavit which would indicate 
that Ms. Evans calculated the interest or, if so, upon which 
basis the said interest was calculated. The Summary Judgment 
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which was ordered indicated that eighteen (18%) percent interest 
may have been applied to that debt The best evidence of the 
standards by which the balance should have been calculated is the 
Promissory Note, itself, which was on the record. The testimony 
of the Plaintiff's witness, Chris Evans, thus raised an ambiguity 
on the record. 
Further, the Affidavit of Ms. Evans did not indicate 
the extent to which she investigated receipts by the Plaintiff 
Credit Union in her work to establish the payments which were 
received Affirmative allegations were set forth in the Answer 
filed pro se by Mr. Eidson which were uncontroverted in the 
Affidavit of Ms. Evans. Accordingly, factual issues remained. 
Finally, as to the account:! ng sworn to by Ms. Evans in 
her Affidavit, another ambiguity is created. Ms. Evans refers to 
an accounting in regard to the Note dated November 20, 1981, in 
the first paragraph 11 of her Affidavit, on page 4. By reference 
to the Complaint, to which a copy of the Note is attached, the 
Court could determine that the Note was made in the face amount 
of Eight Hundred Fifty ($850.00) Dol lars, on November 20, 1981, 
which amount was to have been paid within thirty (30) days. For 
the sake of argument, we disregard the claim of Mr. Eidson that 
the said Not ull. According to the statement of 
Ms. Evans, after application of interest of eighteen (18%) 
percent, and four payments of Thirty ($30.00) Dollars, each, the 
balance on that Eight Hundred Fifty ($850.00) Dollar Note had 
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risen, in eight months, to One Thousand Four Hundred Ten and 
74/100 ($1,410.74) Dollars. There is no statement of facts which 
would indicate a basis for the Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollar 
increase. 
It is the duty of the Court to " * * * evaluate all the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing Summary 
Judgment * * * ", at such time as it makes its decision. 
(Frisbee, Supra, page 389.) Further, 
It is said that because of the drastic 
potentials of a motion for summary judgment, it is 
almost universal practice to scrutinize with care 
and particularity the affidavits of the moving 
party while indulging in some leniency with respect 
the affidavits of the opposition. It has been held 
that upon a motion for summary judgment, the court 
must be critical of the moving papers but not those 
in opposition. 
(73 American Jurisprudence 2d, Summary Judgment, § 37, p. 7 64. 
Citations omitted). 
The Court below abused its discretion by failing to 
examine, critically, or to scrutinize the Affidavit in Support of 
the Motion of Summary Judgment. As indicated above, Plaintiff 
had failed to establish evidence, as required by the Rules, 
sufficient to show that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact. Rather, as was the case in the Frisbee matter, supra the 
Affidavit showed unresolved issues of fact. There, an affidavit 
made bare contentions and conclusions which were unsupported by 
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any facts. The Court ruled that conclusions were not sufficient 
to support: summary judgment. (page 390) 
Finally, the evidence set forth in the Affidavit of 
Chris Evans was not admissible in evidence. At best, in regard 
to the repossession of the automobile, it was made up of hearsay. 
Evidence set forth in an affidavit which is hearsay is improper 
to support a motion for summary judgment. See Western States 
Thrift and Loan Company vs. Blomquist, Utah, 504 P.2d 1019, 
1020-21 (1972). 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the 
standards set forth in Rule 56(c) (e) were not met by the 
Plaintiff. Genuine issues of fact exist. Although the failure 
to respond was unintentional, it was unnecessary for a responsive 
Affidavit to be filed on behalf of the Eidsons. In the Frisbee 
case, supra, at pages 389-390 the Court explained: 
We have said that an opponent of a motion 
for summary judgment must timely file responsive 
affidavits raising factual issues or risk the trial 
court's conclusion that there are no factual 
issues. However, it is not always required that 
the opposing party proffer affidavits in order to 
avoid judgment against him. (Citations and quoted 
language omitted.) 
B• I)efendant s E::i dson est ab 1 :ii shed, throi igti the pro se 
Answer in response to Plaintiff's Complaint # that genuine issues 
of fact remain in dispute. 
Rule 56(c) ai id (e) require that the Court consider the 
pleadings and affidavits on file, inter alia. In (e), it is 
indicated that " * * * mere allegations or denials * * * " shall 
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not be relied upon in opposition to a motion for summary 
j udgment. 
The use and reason for this Rule is indicated in 
Thornock vs. Cook, Utah, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (1979), as indicated 
in Respondent's Brief. There, the Defendant in the action had 
affirmatively alleged duress as a defense. However, in 
subsequent discovery, including, primarily, a deposition, she had 
been unable to present evidence which would support her 
allegation. The Court appropriately concluded that she could not 
rely upon the mere allegation made in her Answer and that summary 
judgment, for that and other reasons, must be granted. 
In the case before this Court, Mr. Eidson signed and 
filed an Answer, pro se, which set forth numerous facts which, 
although not sworn to, were quite apparently made upon his 
personal knowledge. As the Defendant in the action, and the 
person to whom those facts were familiar, if sworn to, the 
evidence would be admissible. Mr. Eidson was competent to 
testify in those regards. Accordingly, the standards of Rule 
56(e) were satisfied in regard to the information set forth in 
the Answer. 
In the matter of Pentecost vs. Harward, Utah, 699 
Pacific 2d 696, 697 (1985), the Court held that a verified 
pleading 
* * * which controverted the facts set forth in 
Harward's Affidavit, created a material issue of 
fact for resolution at trial. We further hold that 
even if Plaintiff's Complaint had not been 
verified, the allegations of her Complaint that 
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were not addressed by Harward's Affidavit were 
sufficient to support claims against him on several 
theories. 
In that case, no affidavit had been filed in response to that 
supporting the motion for summary judgment. 
Therefore, the pro se Answer which was signed and filed 
by Mr. Eidson in this matter should have been considered by the 
Court below as it scrutinized the case. Under Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, his signature " * * * constitutes 
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or 
other paper
 r^at to the best of his knowledge, information, and 
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact * * * " A reading in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Eidson would indicate that the statements were supportable by his 
own, admissible testimony in regard to personal knowledge. 
The rule that the party may not rely upon his mere 
allegations a nd c:ie n I a ] s, supported Thornock, supra, is 
distinguishable. Unlike the situation in Thornock, there was no 
evidence before the Court that the Eidsons' allegations could not 
be supported. Further, in the Thornock case the allegation in 
question was a mere allegation that there was duress. In the 
matter before this Court, the supporting facts were clearly set 
forth in the pi eading signed by Mr. Eidson. 
As indicated in the Appellants' Brief, and above, 
appropriate consideration to the Answer filed by Eidsons would 
have led the Court to conclude that genuine disputed issues 
18 
remained, at least in regard to whether a repossession of an 
automobile had taken place for which Mr. Eidson had not been 
given credit; and as to whether or not the accounting of the 
Plaintiff was accurate. 
It is submitted that it is especially appropriate that 
the Eidsons' pleadings be given weight under these circumstances, 
where it is apparent from the evidence that the Eidsons did not 
receive notice of the Motion for Summary Judgment or the 
Affidavit in support thereof. 
The Plaintiff apparently relies upon Eidsons7 failure 
to respond to the Affidavit to support the conclusion of the 
Court below. Mr. Eidson, in the Defendants' Motion for Appeal 
dated August 10, 1987, refers to his "bafflement" at the news 
that Judgment has been granted, and indicates that he had not 
received anything in regard thereto. He more specifically 
indicates the lack of notice or an opportunity to respond in the 
docketing statement filed with this Court. For these reasons, 
the factual statements in Eidsons7 Answer should be considered by 
the Court in a review to determine whether a question of fact 
exists. 
C. The Utah Court has no jurisdiction over Mrs. 
Eidson, and the Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
Defendants, in their Answer, deny that jurisdiction 
exists against Mrs. Eidson, and, further, affirmatively allege 
facts which would support that conclusion. No evidence was 
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submitted by the Plaintiff which would indicate a basis upon 
which jurisdiction could be established. Accordingly, to grant a 
Judgment against Mrs. Eidson on a Motion for Summary Judgment is 
error. 
Further, based upon the foregoing, even if the issues 
were to be viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 
there would be no basis for a Judgment against Mrs. Eidson. As 
indicated in the foregoing arguments, there remain genuine issues 
of fact in dispute. There would be no basis for a Judgment 
against Mrs. Eidson under any theory submitted by Plaintiff, if 
there is no Judgment against Mr. Eidson. 
Plaintiff submits that Mrs. Eidson is not a party to 
the Appeal However, the Moti on for Appeal filed on August 10, 
by Eidsons, pro se, clearly indicates the parties7 intent to 
appeal the Judgment together. The Appellants7 Brief was filed 
for both, The i ntent of the parties is clear, and ought to be 
honored. 
CONCLUSION 
The record which was before the Court at the time that 
Motion for Summary Judgment was heard, below, failed to establish 
that there were no disputes in regard *-o issues of fact. The 
Affidavit of Ms. Evans, on behalf of the Plaintiff, was 
insufficient: to estab] i sh those facts necessary for the Plaintiff 
to prevail, even assuming they were uncontroverted. No 
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foundation was laid to indicate that the testimony was competent 
in regard to the accounting information submitted to the Court. 
The accounting, on its face, when compared with the documents 
which form the basis therefor, raises issues of fact. One issue 
concerns the interest rate which should have been applied. 
Another concerns an unexplained Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollar 
increase, over the course of eight (8) months, in an amount due 
on a Note. Further, Ms. Evans, in her Affidavit, refers to 
issues raised by the Answer filed by the Defendant, and fails to 
competently resolve those issues. 
Likewise, Ms. Evans fails to establish that she is 
competent to testify or that she has personal knowledge of facts 
in regard to the claim of Eidson that the automobile which was 
collateral for one of the loans was repossessed. She submits 
hearsay evidence to conclude that no repossession has taken 
place. The Affidavit fails to establish that no issue of fact 
remains, but, rather, raises factual issues in regard thereto. 
Eidsons' pro se Answer ought to be given consideration, 
as if it were an affidavit or verified answer to the Complaint. 
It satisfies the requirements in regard to evidence to be 
submitted in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment, under 
Rule 56(e), but for the fact that it is not made under oath. It 
clearly raises issues in regard to the repossession of the 
automobile and the accounting done by the Plaintiff Credit Union. 
The fact that no response was received by the Court, in the form 
21 
of a counter-affidavit, is explained by the subsequent assertions 
of Eidson that he did not receive copies of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Supporting Affidavits. 
The pro se Answer and the Affidavit, read together, 
clearly indicated that issues of fact remain to be resolved in 
this matter. 
Finally, the Judgment against Mrs. Eidson should be 
reversed for lack of any evidence in the record which would 
indicate that the Court has jurisdiction over her. Further, 
there is no basis for a Judgment against Mrs. Eidson if, based 
upon the foregoing, Summary Judgment could not be upheld against 
Mr. Eidson. 
It is apparent that the Court below failed to properly 
scrutinize the evidence placed before it in support of the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. To grant the Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Defendant under the circumstances and based upon the 
evidence before it was error. It is respectfully submitted that 
the Judgment should be reversed and that the matter should be 
remanded to the lower Court/* 
DATED this ^ ' day of May, 1988. 
Attachment: Affidavit of Chris Evans dated June 4, 1987. 
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Telephone: (801) 972-0307 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
, . 
GARFIELD CREDIT UNION 
1 
Plaintiff, ! 
I 
(JAMES V. EIDSON and ] 
MRS. V. EIDSON, 
Defendants, ] 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIS EVANS 
Civil No. C-86-8607 
) Judge Pat Brian 
I 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
j| : ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I j The undersigned, Chris Evans, being first duly sw< 
.deposes and says: 
I 1. That she is the Assistant Manager in charge 
{Collections at Garfield Credit Union, the plaintiff in the al 
entitled action. 
il 2. That she is personally familiar with the 
1-account of the defendants by reason of her position with 
(plaintiff. 
I 3. The defendants owe the plaintiff $6,907.51 pursi 
Hto the promisory note dated March 17, 1981 pursuant to 
plaintiff's First Cause of Action. 
C'J'J 
I 
jA true and correct copy of this promisory note is attached he 
"as Exhibit "A", 
I 4. The defendants further owe $1,779.40 as interes 
jthe date of this Affidavit which was calculated at 18% per a 
from July 19, 1982, and will owe further interest ast the rat 
;18% per annum thereafter. 
5. The defendants owe the plaintiff $1,372.21 purs 
,to the promisory note dated November 20, 1981 and pursuan 
plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. A true and correct cop 
this Promisory Note is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
6. The defendants further owe the amount of $934.7 
interest to the date of this Affidavit calculated at the rat 
14% per annum from July 19, 1982, and continuing at the rat 
14% per annum thereafter. 
| In response to Defendants Answer dated January 
1986, the Affiant responds as follows: 
7. Regarding the March 17, 1981 Promisory Note 
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action, the following payments 
made and applied: 
J Applied to 
Date Amount Principal Balance 
I 
S04/21/81 $120.00 $0 $8542.00 
(First payment was due 
04/01/81) 
.08/01//81 
• 
;|l0/19/81 
1 
1111/04/81 
0.1/18/81 
lh.2/02/81 
$600.00 
$120.00 
$120.69 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$211.27 
$ 62.48 
$ 69.26 
$ 75.97 
$ 76.38 
t 
M O 
Date 
12/18/81 
01/06/82 
01/18/82 
02/02/82 
|02/19/82 
,03/01/82 
,03/16/82 
I 04/02/82 
'04/16/82 
j05/04/82 
05/18/82 
06/02/82 
06/18/82 
07/07/82 
07/19/82 
Amount 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
$120.00 
Applied to 
Principal 
$ 70 .62 
$ 61 .87 
$ 83 .57 
$ 74 .95 
$ 69 .43 
$ 90 .52 
$ 76 .30 
$ 70 .96 
$ 80 .01 
$ 69 .12 
$ 8 0 . 0 1 
$ 78 .47 
$ 76 .18 
$ 68 .52 
$ 87 .80 
Balance 
$7,976.02 
$7,519.38 
$7,663.83 
$6,907.51 
8. All of the foregoing payments were made pursua 
the defendant's payroll deduction coming from his empl 
Kennecott Copper. After July 19, 1982, no further payments 
made by defendant to plaintiff, either by payroll deducti 
directly. However, on January 23, 1983, a transfer was made 
the defendant's share account pursuant to Utah Code Anne 
Section 7-15-7-9-33 in the amount of $276.11, all of which w<= 
interest, leaving the balance the same at $6,907.51. There< 
interest has continued to accrue at the contract rate wi 
payments being made. 
9. Even in Item 7 of Defendant's Answer, he imp 
admits that March 9, 1983 would have been his last pa' 
leaving $5,904.00. However, according to the credit u 
records and statements, that principal amount was approximat 
'$1,000,00 off, or $6,907.51 as heretofore referenced. 
I 10. The repossession of defendant's pledged collat 
as alledged in Defendant's Answer #12 never took place. Plain 
(spent over $300.00 in investigation costs to Mokan Cen 
,Recovery of Blue Springs, Missouri to investigate and try 
locate the collateral. Mokan Central Recovery informed 
Affiant that the car could not be located and that defenda 
Wife had no knowledge of the collateral. To the best knowledg 
• I 
this Affiant, the collateral has never been repossessed 
j | 
I plaintiff nor voluntarily surrendererd or delivered by defen 
"to Plaintiff Credit Un 
11. The following payments have been made on 
November 20, 1981 loan of defendant, which is the subject 
Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action: 
Date 
04/02/82 
05/18/82 
06/02/82 
06/18/82 
07/07/82 
07/19/82 
Amount 
$ 30.00 
$ 30.00 
$ 30.00 
$ 30.00 
$ 30.00 
$ 30.00 
11. The fo 
Applied to 
Principal 
$ 2.85 
$ 0 
$ 16.51 
$ 18.72 
$ 16.78 
$ 21.75 
regoing is a co 
Balance 
$1,410.74 
$1,372.21 
mplete, accur 
the Plaintiff's Credit Union's records and statements of the 
in Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. Those payments were i 
^pursuant to a payroll deduction from defendant's paycheck from 
[employer at Kennecott. After July 19, 1982 no further paym< 
[were made by defendant to plaintiff by either payroll deductio 
otherwise. Interest has continued to accrue on the unpaid baL 
lat the rate of 14% although no payments have been made. 
12, The reason plaintiff has taken so long in brin 
action against the defendants is that plaintiff has been unabl 
locate defendant until just recently. It was then that plain 
was able to send an investigator to inquire of the defend 
regarding the collateral/ which could not be found. 
13. Both of the loans in the First and Second Cause 
Action were taken out and signed by the defendant James Eidsoi 
Garfield Credit Union in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
DATED this Ar^ day of crU^YO- 1987, 
C\ VU <r; v .i * iv_> 
^ 
/ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
l e v a , , 1987. 
CHRIS EVANS 
to before me this -^/^ f> day 
NOTARY-PUBLIC residing At 
Salt Lake City, UT 
|My Commission Expires: 
2-2*/-?/ 
/ « / *# 
